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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to introduce cooperative games with a feasible coalition system which is called antimatroid.
These combinatorial structures generalize the permission structures, which have nice economical applications. With this
goal, we 5rst characterize the approaches from a permission structure with special classes of antimatroids. Next, we
use the concept of interior operator in an antimatroid and we de5ne the restricted game taking into account the limited
possibilities of cooperation determined by the antimatroid. These games extend the restricted games obtained by permission
structures. Finally, we provide a computational method to obtain the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the
restricted game, by using the worths of the original game.
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1. Introduction
A TU-game or transferable utility game describes a situation in which a 5nite set of players N can generate certain
payo=s by cooperation. In a TU-game the players are assumed to be socially identical in the sense that every player
can cooperate with every other player. However, in practice there exist social asymmetries among the players. For this
reason, the game theoretic analysis of decision processes in which one imposes asymmetric constraints on the behavior
of the players has been and continue being an important subject to make a study. Some models, in which have been
analyzed social asymmetries among players in a TU-game, are described in e.g. [18,20,3]. In these models the possibilities
of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a communication graph.
Another type of asymmetry among the players in a TU-game is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [13,14,5]
In these models, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in the so-called
permission structure. Other related models can be found in Faigle, Kern, Derks, Gilles and Peters [6,7,12].
In the present paper, we use the restricted cooperation model derived from an antimatroid. Section 2 introduces
permission structures and antimatroids and we show that given a permission structure, the approaches from it are an
antimatroid but not every antimatroid is an approach from a permission structure. Moreover, we identify the approaches
from an acyclic permission structure with antimatroids satisfying speci5c properties. This study gives rise to a new class of
antimatroids obtained through permission structures. Two new concepts in these structures are essential, on one hand the
path property and on the other hand the feasible hull which are both based on the path characterization of antimatroids.
Section 3 introduces the restricted games on antimatroids which generalize the ones studied on permission structures.
Using the structural properties from the antimatroid we will be able to express the dividends in terms of the original
game. This result will be essential in the last section to provide some formulas to compute the Shapley and Banzhaf
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values for restricted games on antimatroids. In these formulas these values are computed by means of the original game
without having to calculate the restricted game and taking into account only the coalitions in the antimatroid.
2. Permission structures and antimatroids
Permission structures were de5ned by Gilles et al. [14]. They assume that players who participate in a TU-game are
part of a hierarchical organization in which there are players that need permission from certain other players before they
are allowed to cooperate.
For a 5nite set of players N = {1; 2; : : : ; n} such a hierarchical organization is given by a mapping S :N → 2N which is
called a permission structure on N . The players in S(i) are called the successors of player i in the permission structure
S and the players in S−1(i) = { j∈N : i∈ S(j)} are named the predecessors of i in S. A chain of players is an ordered
list (h1; : : : ; ht) where hk+1 ∈ S(hk), for all k = 1; : : : ; t − 1. The transitive closure of a player i in S is the set
Sˆ(i) = { j: there exists a chain (h1; : : : ; ht) with h1 = i; ht = j};
whose players are called the subordinates of player i in S. The players in the set Sˆ−1(i) = { j∈N : i∈ Sˆ(j)} are named
the superiors of i in S. A permission structure S on N is acyclic if i ∈ Sˆ(i), for all i∈N .
In [14] the conjunctive approach to games with a permission structure is de5ned. In this approach it is assumed that
each player needs permission from all his predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate with other players. Alternatively,
in the disjunctive approach as discussed in [4,13] it is assumed that each player needs permission from at least one of his
predecessors before he is allowed to cooperate with others players. Thus, the feasible coalitions in the conjunctive and
disjunctive approaches, respectively, are given by the sets
cS = {E ⊆ N : for every i∈E it holds that S−1(i) ⊆ E};
dS = {E ⊆ N : for every i∈E; S−1(i) = ∅ it holds that S−1(i) ∩ E = ∅}:
We will show that the feasible coalitions in the conjunctive and disjunctive approaches of permission structures are
identi5ed with special classes of set systems called antimatroids. Antimatroids were introduced by Dilworth [8] as particular
examples of semimodular lattices. Several authors have obtained the same concept by abstracting various combinatorial
situations. A systematic study of these structures was started by Edelman and Jamison [11] emphasizing the combinatorial
abstraction of convexity. The latter was then shown by Edelman [10] to be a crucial property of closures induced by
what he called convex geometries, a dual concept of antimatroids (see [2]). Jim(enez-Losada [16] introduced antimatroids
in games, de5ning games on the coalitions of the set system given by the antimatroid.
Denition 1. An antimatroid A on N is a family of subsets of 2N , satisfying
A1. ∅∈A.
A2. (Accessibility) If E ∈A, E = ∅, then there exists i∈E such that E\{i}∈A.
A3. (Closed under union) If E; F ∈A then E ∪ F ∈A.
Now, we need to introduce some well-known concepts about antimatroids, which can be found in [17].
The de5nition of antimatroid implies the following augmentation property, i.e., if E; F ∈A with |E|¿ |F | then there
exists i∈E\F such that F ∪ {i}∈A. From now on we assume that the antimatroid A is normal, i.e.,
A4. For every i∈N there exists an E ∈A such that i∈E.
In particular, this last property implies that N ∈A and therefore this means that the whole group of players decides to
cooperate.
Let A be an antimatroid on N . This set family allows to de5ne the interior operator int : 2N →A, given by
int(E) =
⋃
{F⊆E : F∈A}
F ∈A
for all E ⊆ N . This operator is the dual one of the closure operator in a convex geometry and satis5es the following
properties which characterize it:
I1. int(∅) = ∅,
I2. int(E) ⊆ E,
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I3. if E ⊆ F then int(E) ⊆ int(F),
I4. int(int(E)) = int(E),
I5. if i; j∈ int(E) and j ∈ int(E\{i}) then i∈ int(E\{ j}).
Let A be an antimatroid on N . A feasible continuation or augmentation point of E ∈A is a player i∈N\E such that
E ∪ {i}∈A, i.e., those players that can be joined to a feasible coalition keeping feasibility. This elements are denoted
as au(E). In a dual way, a player that can leave a feasible coalition E keeping feasibility is called endpoint or extreme
point [11]. The endpoints of E are denoted by ex(E). By condition A2 the sets ex(E) = ∅, for all E ∈A, E = ∅. In the
same way, using antimatroid de5nition and A4, the sets au(E) = ∅, for all E ∈A, E = N .
A set E in A is a path if it has a single endpoint. So, the set E in A is called an i-path if it has i as unique endpoint.
An i-path can be considered as a rooted set denoted by (E; i), i.e., E is a minimal set in A containing i. In particular, a
set is in A or is feasible in A if and only if it is a union of paths. This leads to a characterization of antimatroids in
terms of paths (see [17]).
As a generalization of a rooted path in a player, we can give the following concept about coalitions.
Denition 2. Let A be an antimatroid on N and E ⊆ N . A set F ⊆ N is a feasible hull of E if F ∈A, E ⊆ F and there
exists no H ∈A with E ⊆ H ⊂ F , i.e., it is a feasible minimal set in A and contains the set E.
We denote by A(E) the family of feasible hulls of E ⊆ N . Notice that A(E) = ∅. We show in the following result that
this de5nition generalizes the path de5nition.
Proposition 1. Let A be an antimatroid on N. The feasible hulls of {i}, with i∈N are the family of the i-paths of A.
Proof. If E is a feasible hull of {i}, then i∈E and there exists no F ∈A with i∈F ⊂ E. We have to prove that E is
an i-path, by condition A2 there exists some endpoint of E, suppose that the possible endpoints j of E are di=erent from
i. In this case, it holds that i∈E\{ j} ⊂ E and as j is an endpoint E\{ j}∈A, what led us to contradiction. So, the
unique endpoint of E is i.
If E is an i-path and it is not a feasible hull of {i} then there exists F ∈A with i∈F and F ⊂ E. Applying the
augmentation property, there exists j∈E\{i} such that E\{ j}∈A. This contradicts the fact that E is an i-path.
Now we consider the relations between acyclic permission structures and antimatroids.
Proposition 2. If the feasible coalition system A is derived from an disjunctive or conjunctive approach of an acyclic
permission structure then A is an antimatroid.
Proof. Gilles and Owen [13] and Gilles et al. [14] showed that the feasible coalitions system A derived from the
conjunctive or disjunctive approach contains the empty set and that it is closed under union. Therefore, it suOces to prove
that the system A is accessible. Let S be an acyclic permission structure on N . As N is a 5nite set, given a feasible
coalition E, E = ∅, there exists a player i∈E such that S(i)∩ E = ∅ by acyclicity of S. Then, the coalition E\{i} is also
feasible, and hence we obtain the condition A2.
The reverse of Proposition 2 is not true (see Example 1). This result will later be useful to generalize the restricted
games on permission structures and introduce in the next section the restricted games on antimatroids. Next, some speci5c
antimatroids are de5ned to characterize the feasible coalition systems derived from the conjunctive approach of an acyclic
permission structure.
The so-called poset antimatroids are a particular case of antimatroid, which are formed by the ideals of a poset P or,
in an equivalent way, by the 5lters. The poset antimatroids can be characterized as the unique antimatroids which are
closed under intersection, i.e., if E; F ∈A then E ∩ F ∈A.
Lemma 1. Let A be an antimatroid. A is a poset antimatroid if and only if every i∈N has a unique i-path in A.
Proof. Suppose that A is a poset antimatroid. Let E; F , E = F , be two distinct i-paths for i∈N . Then E ∩ F ∈A with
i∈E ∩ F . Assume without loss of generality that E\F = ∅. By the augmentation property there exists a j∈E\(E ∩ F) =
E\F ⊆ E\{i} such that E\{ j}∈A. This is in contradiction with E being an i-path.
Suppose that every i∈N has a unique i-path in A. Take E; F ∈A. If E ∩ F = ∅ then E ∩ F ∈A by A1. If E ∩ F = ∅
then by Proposition 1, for every i∈E∩F there exists an i-path Hi1 ⊆ E and there exists an i-path Hi2 ⊆ F . By assumption
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Hi1 = H
i
2 = H
i is the unique i-path in A. So, Hi ∈A and Hi ⊆ E ∩ F , for all i∈E ∩ F . Therefore, E ∩ F =⋃i∈E∩F H i
and by A3 E ∩ F ∈A. Thus, A is a poset antimatroid.
In the following result we identify the feasible coalition system derived from the conjunctive approach on an acyclic
permission structure with a poset antimatroid.
Theorem 1. A is a poset antimatroid if and only if there is an acyclic permission structure S such that A= cS .
Proof. Let A be a poset antimatroid. For i∈N , denote the unique i-path in A by PAi . Now, de5ne permission structure
S :N → 2N by S−1(i) = PAi \{i}, for all i∈N . We have to prove that S is acyclic. Suppose i∈ Sˆ(i) then there exists
(h1; : : : ; ht) with h1 = i, ht = i and such that hk+1 ∈ S(hk), for all k =1; : : : t− 1, i.e., hk ∈PAk+1. Moreover, PAk ⊆ PAk+1, for
all k. Since PAk+1 ∈A by Proposition 1 we have that the unique hk -path is contained in PAk+1. But PAk =PAk+1 is impossible
and hence, we get PAi ( PAi . So, S is acyclic. We are left to show that A= cS .
Let E ∈cS then S−1(i) ⊆ E, for all i∈E, i.e., PAi ⊆ E, for all i∈E, therefore
⋃
i∈E P
A
i ⊆ E. Since i∈PAi , for all
i∈N we also have E ⊆ ⋃i∈E PAi . Thus, E =⋃i∈E PAi ∈A since a union of paths is feasible by A3. Clearly, if E ∈A
with i∈E then S−1(i) = PAi \{i} ⊆ E, and thus E ∈cS .
By Proposition 2, the feasible coalition system from a conjunctive approach of an acyclic permission structure is an
antimatroid. Gilles et al. [14] showed that the feasible coalition system from the conjunctive approach is closed under
intersection, therefore this approach is a poset antimatroid.
Now we are interested in characterizing the antimatroids that can be the set of disjunctive feasible coalitions of some
acyclic permission structure. With this goal we introduce the following de5nition.
Denition 3. An antimatroid A on N is said to have the path property if
P1. Every path E has a unique feasible ordering, i.e. E := (i1 ¿ · · ·¿it) such that {i1; : : : ; ik}∈A for all 16 k6 t.
Furthermore, the union of these orderings for all paths is a partial ordering of N .
P2. If E; F and E\{i} are paths such that the endpoint of F equals the endpoint of E\{i}, then F ∪ {i}∈A.
Observe that every path has a unique feasible ordering if and only if for any i-path E with |E|¿ 1 we have that E\{i}
is a path. In the next theorem, we identify those antimatroids that satisfy the path property in relation to the feasible
coalition systems derived from acyclic permission structures.
Theorem 2. An antimatroid A has the path property if and only if there is an acyclic permission structure S such that
A= dS .
Proof. Let A be an antimatroid with the path property. De5ne S :N → 2N by
S−1(i) = { j∈N : there exists an i-path E such that E\{i} is a j-path}:
First, we show that the permission structure S is acyclic. Suppose not, then let i∈N such that i∈ Sˆ(i) and so there
exists a chain (h1; : : : ; ht) such that h1 = ht = {i} and hk+1 ∈ S(hk), for all k = 1; : : : ; t − 1. Hence
i∈ S−1(h2); : : : ; hk ∈ S−1(hk+1); : : : ; ht−1 ∈ S−1(i):
Since A satis5es property P1, we can obtain a collection of paths with the following orderings:
(· · ·¿i¿h2); : : : ; (· · ·¿hk ¿hk+1); : : : ; (· · ·¿ht−1 ¿i):
Thus, the cycle i ¿ h2 ¿ · · ·¿ht−1 ¿i contradicts property P1.
Next, we prove that the antimatroid A=dS . If E ∈A we have that for every i∈E there exists an i-path F ⊆ E. Thus,
for every i∈E, {i}∈A or there exists an i-path F ⊆ E and a j∈F\{i} such that F\{i} is a j-path in A. Therefore,
for every i∈E, as {i} is the unique i-path, S−1(i) = ∅ or S−1(i) ∩ E = ∅ and hence E ∈dS .
Suppose that E ∈dS . We prove that E ∈A by induction on |E|. If |E| = 1, i.e., E = {i}, then S−1(i) = ∅. Thus,
the unique i-path is E = {i}∈A. Proceeding by induction, assume that E′ ∈A if |E′| = |E| − 1. Proposition 2 im-
plies that dS is accessible and hence there exists a i∈E such that E\{i}∈dS . The induction hypothesis implies that
E\{i}∈A.
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Ø
Fig. 1. Antimatroid. Fig. 2. Antimatroid with the path property.
If S−1(i) = ∅ then {i}∈A and so E = (E\{i}) ∪ {i}∈A. Otherwise, there exists an element j∈ S−1(i) ∩ E = ∅.
Since E\{i}∈A there exists a j-path F ⊆ E\{i}. Observe that j∈ S−1(i) implies that there exists an i-path E′ such that
E′\{i} is a j-path. Property 2 then yields F ∪ {i}∈A. In view of A3 we obtain that (F ∪ {i}) ∪ (E\{i}) = E ∈A.
Conversely, let S be an acyclic permission structure. By Proposition 2, the family A := dS is an antimatroid. We have
to show that A satis5es the path property.
We 5rst prove that if E is an i-path with |E|¿ 1 then S(i) ∩ E = ∅ and S−1(j) = ∅ or |S−1(j) ∩ E|= 1 for all j∈E.
Suppose that S(i)∩E = ∅. By the acyclicity of S there exists a j∈ Sˆ(i)∩E such that S(j)∩E=∅, and hence E\{ j}∈dS .
Since j = i we arrive at a contradiction, since E is an i-path.
Now assume j∈E with |S−1(j)∩E|¿ 1. We claim that S(h)∩E = ∅, for all h∈E\{i}. Otherwise we have E\{h}∈dS
where h = i contradicting that E is an i-path. Then there exists a g∈E with |S−1(g) ∩ E|¿ 1 and |S−1(h) ∩ E| = 1 for
all h∈ Sˆ(g) ∩ E. Since S(i) ∩ E = ∅ we obtain i ∈ S−1(g) ∩ E. By acyclicity of S it holds that S(k) ∩ E = {g}, for all
k ∈ S−1(g) ∩ E. Thus E\{k}∈dS , for all k ∈ S−1(g) ∩ E, contradicting that E is an i-path. Therefore, for any i-path E
with |E|¿ 1 we have that E\{i} is a path. Then each i-path E has a unique feasible ordering E := (i1 ¿ · · ·¿it) where
it = i and
{i1}= S−1(i2) ∩ E; : : : ; {it−1}= S−1(i) ∩ E:
The union of these linear orderings (as binary relations) for all paths is a rePexive and transitive relation on N . If the
relation is not a partial order then there exists a cycle and this is a contradiction with the acyclicity of S. Thus the
requirements of property P1 are ful5lled.
To show property P2, let E be an i-path and assume that E\{i} is a j-path with { j}= S−1(i)∩E. For every j-path F
we have that S−1(h)=∅ or |S−1(h)∩F |=1 for all h∈F . Moreover, S−1(i)∩F={ j} = ∅. Thus, F ∪{i}∈dS =A.
Example 1 (Fig. 1). Let N = {1; 2; 3; 4} and the following family of subsets:
A= {∅; {1}; {4}; {1; 2}; {1; 4}; {3; 4}; {1; 2; 3}; {1; 2; 4}; {1; 3; 4}; {2; 3; 4}; N}:
Observe that A is an antimatroid and it does not satisfy the path property. The path E = {1; 2; 3} has the ordering
(1¿ 2¿ 3) and the path F = {2; 3; 4} has the ordering (4¿ 3¿ 2). Then the union of the above orderings is not a
partial order on N .
Example 2 (Fig. 2). Consider the antimatroid A on N = {1; 2; 3; 4}, where
A= {∅; {1}; {1; 2}; {1; 3}; {1; 2; 3}; {1; 2; 4}; {1; 3; 4}; {1; 2; 3; 4}}:
It can be checked that A satis5es the path property.
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{1,2,3,4}
{1,2,3}
{1,2} {1,3}
{1}
Ø
Fig. 3. Poset antimatroid.
Example 3 (Fig. 3). Consider the poset antimatroid B on N = {1; 2; 3; 4} where
B = {∅; {1}; {1; 2}; {1; 3}; {1; 2; 3}; {1; 2; 3; 4}}:
Note that B does not satisfy the path property since the 4-path E= {1; 2; 3; 4} is such that E\{4}= {1; 2; 3} is not a path
and so E has two feasible orderings.
As we have seen in Example 3, posets antimatroids do not satisfy the path property in general. Next, we characterize
the class of antimatroids which satis5es the path property. To obtain this result, we 5rst provide a lemma on games with
permission structures. This lemma states that the permission structures for which the sets of conjunctive and disjunctive
feasible coalitions coincide are exactly the permission forest structures.
Denition 4. An acyclic permission structure S is a permission forest structure if |S−1(i)|6 1, for all i∈N .
Lemma 2. Let S be an acyclic permission structure. Then S is a permission forest structure if and only if cS = 
d
S .
Proof. Let S be an acyclic permission structure. If S is a permission forest structure then for every i∈N we have that
S−1(i) = ∅ or S−1(i) ∩ E = ∅ if and only if S−1(i) ⊆ E. But then cS = dS .
If S is not a permission forest structure then there exists j∈N with |S−1(j)|¿ 2. If h∈ S−1(j) then Sˆ−1(j)\{h}∈dS\cS ,
implying that cS = dS .
The next theorem states that the poset antimatroids satisfying the path property, are exactly those antimatroids that can
be obtained as the set of conjunctive or disjunctive feasible coalitions of some permission forest structure. Note that given
A a poset antimatroid, A satis5es the path property if and only if it satis5es P1.
Theorem 3. A is a poset antimatroid satisfying the path property if and only if there exists a permission forest structure
S such that A= cS = 
d
S .
Proof. Suppose that A is a poset antimatroid satisfying the path property. De5ne the permission structure S :N → 2N by
S−1(i) = { j∈N : there exists an i-path E such that E\{i} is a j-path}:
Since A is a poset antimatroid, Lemma 1 implies that there is a unique i-path for every i∈N . But then S is a permission
forest structure. We are left to show that cS =A. For every i∈N , let Hi be the unique i-path in A. Then E ∈cS if and
only if S−1(i) ⊆ E, for all i∈E if and only if Hi ⊆ E, for all i∈E if and only if ⋃i∈E H i =E if and only if E ∈A. By
Lemma 2 we conclude that A= cS = 
d
S .
Assume that A = cS = 
d
S for some acyclic permission structure S. By Theorem 1, 
c
S is a poset antimatroid. By
Theorem 2 it is satis5ed the path property. So, A is a poset antimatroid satisfying the path property.
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3. Restricted games on antimatroids
Let us denote by N the real vector space of all TU-games (N; v), i.e. functions v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0. The
elements of N ={1; 2; : : : ; n} are called players, the subsets E ∈ 2N coalitions and v(E) is the worth of E. Every TU-game
(N; v) is uniquely determined by the collection of its worths {v(E) :E ⊆ N; E = ∅}. Then N will be identi5ed with
R2
n−1. For any E ⊆ N; E = ∅, we de5ne the unanimity game
uE(F) =
{
1 if E ⊆ F;
0 otherwise:
Every game is a unique linear combination of unanimity games (cf. [21]),
v =
∑
F∈2N\{∅}
dv(F)uF ; where dv(F) =
∑
E⊆F
(−1)|F|−|E|v(E):
We shall call dv(F) the dividend of F in the game v and dv(∅) = 0 [15].
According to the previous section, the interior of a coalition E in an antimatroid is the largest part of E that is active
or feasible. In other words and taking into account that the antimatroid structure limits the possibilities of coalitional
formation in a TU-game, the interior of E are those players of E that are allowed to cooperate. Therefore, the interior
is what Gilles and Owen [13] and Gilles et al. [14] called (conjunctive or disjunctive) sovereign part in a permission
structure. So, we de5ne a restricted game on an antimatroid for a coalition E as the value obtained on the interior of E.
Denition 5. Let A be an antimatroid on N . If v is a TU-game then the restricted game on A is de5ned by vA(E) =
v(int(E)); E ⊆ N .
Our next aim is to obtain the expression of the dividends of the restricted game in terms of the dividends of the original
game. For that, we 5rst need some results.
Proposition 3. Let A be an antimatroid on N and E ⊆ N . The restricted game of the unanimity game uE on A is
(uE)A =
∨
F∈A(E) uF . Moreover, its dividends are given, for all F ⊆ N , by
d(uE )A(F) =
∑
{H⊆F :∃T∈A(E);H⊇T}
(−1)|F|−|H |:
In particular, d(uE )A(F) = 0, if F + E and d(uE )A(F) = 1, if F ∈A(E).
Proof. Let H ⊆ N , then
(uE)A(H) = uE(int(H)) =
{
1 if E ⊆ int(H);
0 otherwise:
If E ⊆ int(H)∈A then there exists F ∈A(E), such that F ⊆ int(H), therefore uF (H)=1. In this case ∨F∈A(E) uF (H)=1.
Otherwise, H does not contain any feasible hull of E and therefore uF (H) = 0, for all F ∈A(E), which implies that∨
F∈A(E) uF (H) = 0.
Let us consider F ⊆ N ,
d(uE )A(F) =
∑
H⊆F
(−1)|F|−|H |(uE)A(H) =
∑
H⊆F
(−1)|F|−|H |
∨
T∈A(E)
uT (H) =
∑
{H⊆F : ∃T∈A(E);H⊇T}
(−1)|F|−|H |:
If F + E then there is not any H ⊆ F which contains some feasible hull of E and hence d(uE )A(F) = 0. Finally, if
F ∈A(E), by de5nition, the unique term in the above formula is obtained for H = F and therefore d(uE )A(F) = 1.
Next, we consider the particular case from a poset antimatroid. We will take into account that for these antimatroids
each coalition has a unique feasible hull (the set obtained as the intersection of all feasible coalitions that contain the
coalition) since the intersection is a closed operation.
Corollary 1. Let A be a poset antimatroid on N and E⊆N . The restricted game (uE)A = uT , where T is the unique
feasible hull of E. Moreover, all dividends are null except d(uE )A(T ) = 1.
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Proof. By Proposition 3, if F = T then d(uE )A(T ) = 1. Moreover, if F+E then d(uE )A(F) = 0. Finally, if F ⊇ E and
F = T , since F ) T , we have that
d(uE )A(F) =
∑
T⊆H⊆F
(−1)|F|−|H | =
|F|∑
h=|T |
( |F | − |T |
h− |T |
)
(−1)|F|−h = (1− 1)|F|−|T | = 0:
This completes the proof.
Using the dividends of the restricted games of unanimity games we can obtain the dividends of any restricted game on
the antimatroid.
Theorem 4. Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a TU-game. The dividends of the game vA are, for all F ⊆N ,
dvA(F) =


∑
E⊆F
d(uE )A(F)dv (E) if F ∈A;
0 otherwise:
Proof. We 5rst suppose that F ∈A, then
dvA(F) =
∑
E⊆F
(−1)|F|−|E|v(int(E)) =
∑
{E⊆F : E∈A}

 ∑
{H⊆F :int(H)=E}
(−1)|F|−|H |

 v(E):
Observe that given E⊆F such that E ∈A the possible elements in the set {H ⊆F : int(H) = E} are those coalitions
H contained in F that contain E but that do not contain any augmentation player of E (by condition A2). Let kE =
|F − (E ∪ au(E))| then
dvA(F) =
∑
{E⊆F : E∈A}
(
kE∑
p=0
(
kE
p
)
(−1)|F|−p
)
v(E) = (−1)|F|
∑
{E⊆F : E∈A}
(1− 1)kE v(E) = 0:
It is satis5ed that kE ¿ 1 since F ∈ A and moreover the set E ∪ [au(E) ∩ F] is feasible because E ∪ [au(E) ∩ F] =⋃
j∈au(E)∩F (E ∪ { j})∈A, by condition A3 and the augmentation player de5nition.
Suppose that F ∈A, now we use induction on the cardinal of F . If |F |= 1, then F = {i} and we have that
dvA({i}) =
∑
E⊆{i}
(−1)1−|E|vA(E) =−v(int(∅)) + v(int({i})) = v({i});
since by I1 int(∅) = ∅ and as F ∈A then int({i}) = {i}. On the other hand,∑
E⊆{i}
d(uE )A({i})dv(E) = d(u∅)A({i})dv(∅) + d(u{i})A({i})dv({i}) = v({i});
because dv(∅) = 0, dv({i}) = v({i}) and by Proposition 3, d(u{i})A({i}) = 1 since {i} is the feasible hull of {i}. Suppose
that the result is true if |F |6 k and we will prove it if |F |= k + 1. As F ∈A, int(F) = F ,∑
E⊆F
dv(E) = v(F) = vA(F) =
∑
E⊆F
dvA(E) =
∑
E(F
dvA(E) + dvA(F):
By using the induction hypothesis and the case E ∈A considered above we have that
dvA(F) =
∑
E⊆F
dv(E)−
∑
{E(F : E∈A}
dvA(E)
=
∑
E⊆F
dv(E)−
∑
{E(F : E∈A}

∑
H⊆E
d(uH )A(E)dv(H)


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=
∑
E⊆F
dv(E)−
∑
E(F

 ∑
E⊆H(F
d(uE )A(H)

 dv(E)
= dv(F) +
∑
E(F

1− ∑
E⊆H(F
d(uE )A(H)

dv(E):
As d(uF )A(F) = 1 by Proposition 3 and F ∈A, it remains to prove
1−
∑
E⊆H(F
d(uE )A(H) = d(uE )A(F) ∀E ( F;
since F is the unique feasible hull of F . Applying Proposition 3, we get
1−
∑
E⊆H(F
d(uE )A(H) = 1−
∑
E⊆H(F
∑
{T⊆H : ∃R∈A(E);T⊇R}
(−1)|H |−|T |
= (−1)|F|−|F| −
∑
{T(F : ∃R∈A(E);T⊇R}
∑
T⊆H(F
(−1)|H |−|T |:
Taking into account that∑
T⊆H(F
(−1)|H |−|T | =
∑
T⊆H⊆F
(−1)|H |−|T | − (−1)|F|−|T | =−(−1)|F|−|T |
since ∑
T⊆H⊆F
(−1)|H |−|T | = (1− 1)|F|−|T | = 0; (1)
we conclude that
1−
∑
E⊆H(F
d(uE )A(H) = (−1)|F|−|F| +
∑
{T(F : ∃R∈A(E);T⊇R}
(−1)|F|−|T | =
∑
{T⊆F :∃R∈A(E);T⊇R}
(−1)|F|−|T | = d(uE )A(F):
Note that in formula (1) we may take |F | − |T | = 0, because otherwise F would be a feasible hull of E and∑
E⊆H(F d(uE )A(H) = 0.
In particular, in Proposition 3 the dividends of a non-feasible coalition for the restricted game of a unanimity game are
also zero.
Corollary 2. Let A be a poset antimatroid on N and let v be a TU-game. The dividends of the game vA are given,
for all F ⊆ N , by
dvA(F) =
∑
{E⊆F : F=A(E)}
dv(E);
where A(E) denote the unique feasible hull of E.
Proof. It is straightforward obtained using Corollary 1 and Theorem 4. Notice that if F ∈ A then dvA(F) = 0, since in
this case F is not a feasible hull.
In the next result we will show that the dividends can be expressed in terms of only the characteristic function evaluated
on the feasible coalitions in the antimatroid. For this, we will use the MQobius inversion formula for partially ordered sets
(see [22]). Notice that an antimatroid A with the inclusion relation is, in particular, a lattice taking into account the
following operations, E ∨ F = E ∪ F; E ∧ F = int(E ∩ F), for all E; F ∈A. We denote by [E; F]A the interval of
coalitions in A that contain E and are contained in F . Given E ∈A the set E+ is the coalition formed by E and the
augmentation players, i.e., E+ = E ∪ au(E).
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Lemma 3. Let A be an antimatroid on N , it holds that
1. If F ⊆ E, E; F ∈A, the interval [F; E]A is a Boolean algebra if and only if E\F = au(F) ∩ E.
2. If E ∈A then [E; E+]A is a Boolean algebra.
Proof. 1. In the lattice A, a coalition T covers F if T = F ∪ {i}, where i∈ au(F) (by the augmentation property such i
exists). We prove that [F; E]A is a Boolean algebra if and only if E can be written as E=
⋃
i∈au(F)∩E(F ∪{i}). If [F; E]A
is a Boolean algebra then F ∪{i}∈A for all i∈E\F and therefore i∈ au(F)∩E. The other inclusion is straightforward.
So, we can conclude that [F; E]A is a Boolean algebra if and only if E\F = au(F) ∩ E.
2. For all i∈E+\E it holds that i∈ au(E) and therefore E ∪ {i}∈A. By property (A3) it is concluded that each
coalition of [E; E+] is feasible.
Lemma 4. Let A be an antimatroid on N and E; F ∈A, with F ⊆ E. Then its M9obius function is given by
(F; E) =
{
(−1)|E|−|F| if E\F = au(F) ∩ E;
0 otherwise:
Proof. It is well-known [22] that the MQobius function of an interval [F; E]A is zero unless E is the union of those
coalitions that cover F in the interval. By the proof of Lemma 3, this is equivalent to E\F = au(F) ∩ E. By Lemma
3 the equality is true if and only if [F; E] is a Boolean algebra. The MQobius function in the Boolean algebra [F; E] is
(F; E) = (−1)|E|−|F|. So, we conclude the result.
Theorem 5. Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a TU-game. The dividends of vA are, for all E ⊆ N ,
dvA(E) =


∑
{F∈A :E∈[F;F+]}
(−1)|E|−|F|v(F) if E ∈A;
0 otherwise:
Proof. For every E⊆N it holds that
vA =
∑
F⊆N
dvA(F)uF :
By Theorem 4, the dividends of any non-feasible coalition are zero. Given a feasible coalition E ∈A then vA(E)=v(E)=∑
{F∈A :F⊆E} dvA(F). Using the MQobius inversion formula [22] applied to v and dvA on A we get
dvA(E) =
∑
{F∈A :F⊆E}
(F; E)v(F):
Then, replacing the MQobius function obtained in Lemma 4 we have that
dvA(E) =
∑
{F∈A :F⊆E;E\F=au(F)∩E}
(−1)|E|−|F|v(F):
The following equality is immediate:
{F ∈A : F ⊆ E; E\F = au(F) ∩ E}= {F ∈A : E ∈ [F; F+]A};
and by Lemma 3, the interval [F; F+]A is a Boolean algebra.
4. The restricted Shapley and Banzhaf values on antimatroids
In this section, we consider the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the restricted game on an antimatroid to obtain new
values for a game. Taking into account the cooperation possibilities, the values that we de5ne generalize the Shapley
and Banzhaf values de5ned on permission structures and studied in [4,5,13,14]. Given the game v the Shapley [21] and
Banzhaf [1] values for the player i in the game v are denoted by Shi(v) and Bai(v), respectively, and in terms of dividends
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they are given by
Shi(v) =
∑
{E⊆N :i∈E}
dv(E)
|E| ;
Bai(v) =
∑
{E⊆N :i∈E}
dv(E)
2|E|−1
:
The Banzhaf power index is introduced for voting situations. A generalization for arbitrary TU-games as in, e.g., [9,19]
is considered.
Denition 6. Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a TU-game. The restricted Shapley value is de5ned by Sh(v;A)=
Sh(vA). The restricted Banzhaf value is given by Ba(v;A) = Ba(vA).
The linearity of these values and Theorem 4 imply that, for every i∈N ,
Shi(v;A) =
∑
{E∈A :i∈E}
dvA(E)
|E| ; (2)
Bai(v;A) =
∑
{E∈A :i∈E}
dvA(E)
2|E|−1
: (3)
From Theorem 5 we can get a formula to compute these values using directly the characteristic function of the original
game.
Theorem 6. Let A be an antimatroid on N and let v be a TU-game. We consider the following collections, for i∈N ,
Ai = {E ∈A : i∈E};
A+i = {E ∈A : i∈ ex(E); (E\{i})+ = E+};
A∗i = {E ∈A : i∈ au(E); (E ∪ {i})+ = E+}:
Then
1. The restricted Shapley value for player i is given by
Shi(v;A) =
∑
E∈A+i
(e − 1)!(e+ − e)!
e+!
[v(E)− v(E\{i})]
+
∑
E∈Ai\A+i
(e − 1)!(e+ − e)!
e+!
v(E)−
∑
E∈A∗i
e!(e+ − e − 1)!
e+!
v(E):
2. The restricted Banzhaf value for player i is given by
Bai(v;A) =
∑
E∈A+i
1
2e+−1
[v(E)− v(E\{i})] +
∑
E∈Ai \A+i
1
2e+−1
v(E)−
∑
E∈A∗i
1
2e+−1
v(E);
where e = |E| and e+ = |E+|.
Proof. 1. By Theorem 5 and formula (2)
Shi(v;A) =
∑
{F∈A :i∈F}
1
|F |

 ∑
{E∈A :F∈[E;E+]A}
(−1)|F|−|E|v(E)

 :
12 E. Algaba et al. / Discrete Mathematics 282 (2004) 1–15
Hence,
Shi(v;A) =
∑
E∈A

 ∑
{F∈[E;E+]A:i∈F}
1
|F | (−1)
|F|−|E|

 v(E) =∑
E∈A
ci(E)v(E);
where we denote by ci(E) the coeOcient of v(E) in the above sum. We distinguish two cases: i∈E and i ∈ E.
If i∈E, as [E; E+]A is a Boolean algebra then
ci(E) =
e+∑
k=e
(
e+ − e
k − e
)
(−1)k−e
k
=
e+−e∑
k=0
(
e+ − e
k
)
(−1)k
k + e
=
e+−e∑
k=0
(
e+ − e
k
)
(−1)k
∫ 1
0
xk+e−1 dx
=
∫ 1
0
xe−1(1− x)e+−e dx = (e − 1)!(e
+ − e)!
e+!
:
If i ∈ E then i∈ au(E) otherwise ci(E) = 0. In that case, [E ∪ {i}; E+] is a Boolean algebra and hence
ci(E) =
e+∑
k=e+1
(
e+ − e − 1
k − e − 1
)
(−1)k−e
k
=
e+−e−1∑
k=0
(
e+ − e − 1
k
)
(−1)k+1
k + e + 1
=−
e+−e−1∑
k=0
(
e+ − e − 1
k
)
(−1)k
∫ 1
0
xk+e dx
=−
∫ 1
0
xe(1− x)e+−e−1 dx =− e!(e
+ − e − 1)!
e+!
:
Replacing the coeOcients in the formula it boils down to
Shi(v;A) =
∑
E∈Ai
(e − 1)!(e+ − e)!
e+!
v(E)−
∑
{E∈A :i∈au(E)}
e!(e+ − e − 1)!
e+!
v(E): (4)
For every E ∈Ai, if i∈ ex(E) and (E\{i})+ = E+, then E ∈A+i . In that case, we have that E\{i}∈A and ci(E\{i}) =
−ci(E), and therefore we can group both coeOcients. If E ∈Ai\A+i its coeOcient appears in the 5rst sum but it can not
be grouped. Finally, if none of these possibilities happen then E ∈A, i∈ au(E) and (E\{i})+ = E+, i.e., E ∈A∗i . So,
these appear in the second sum.
2. By the above part and formula (3), we know that
Bai(v;A) =
∑
E∈A
ci(E)v(E);
where in this case
ci(E) =
∑
{F∈[E;E+]A:i∈F}
1
2|F|−1
(−1)|F|−|E|
if i∈E then
ci(E) =
e+∑
k=e
(
e+ − e
k − e
)
(−1)k−e
2k−1
=
e+−e∑
k=0
(
e+ − e
k
)
(−1)k
2k+e−1
=
1
2e+−1
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Fig. 4. Fig. 5.
and if i∈ au(E) then
ci(E) =
e+∑
k=e+1
(
e+ − e − 1
k − e − 1
)
(−1)k−e
2k−1
=−
e+−e−1∑
k=0
(
e+ − e − 1
k
)
(−1)k
2k+e
=
−1
2e+−1
:
Doing the same process as in the case of the Shapley value we get the formula for the Banzhaf value.
Remark 1. Notice that if A=2N then the formulas obtained in Theorem 6 are equal to the Shapley and Banzhaf values.
Moreover, Eq. (4) is eOcient from the computational point of view and coincides with Eq. (11) of Shapley [21].
To apply the computational method developed in this section we analyze two examples.
Example 4. Let N = {1; 2; 3; 4}, given v = u{4} the unanimity game on the coalition {4} and S the acyclic permission
structure on N given by (see Fig. 4)
S(1) = {2; 3}; S(2) = S(3) = {4}; S(4) = ∅:
The disjunctive and the conjunctive approaches in the permission structure are the antimatroids considered in Examples
2 and 3 respectively (see Figs. 2 and 3).
To compute the restricted Shapley value on A and B we use formula (4) since so we only have to calculate Ai and
{E ∈A : i∈ au(E)}. Notice that with this formula, if the game changes but the structure continue being the same the
calculations on these sets only are done once. So, the corresponding sets Ai belong to the disjunctive approach are given
by
A1 = {{1}; {1; 2}; {1; 3}; {1; 2; 3}; {1; 2; 4}; {1; 3; 4}; N};
A2 = {{1; 2}; {1; 2; 3}; {1; 2; 4}; N};
A3 = {{1; 3}; {1; 2; 3}; {1; 3; 4}; N};
A4 = {{1; 2; 4}; {1; 3; 4}; N}
and
{E ∈A : 1∈ au(E)}= {∅};
{E ∈A : 2∈ au(E)}= {{1}; {1; 3}; {1; 3; 4}};
{E ∈A : 3∈ au(E)}= {{1}; {1; 2}; {1; 2; 4}};
{E ∈A : 4∈ au(E)}= {{1; 2}; {1; 3}; {1; 2; 3}}
thus, applying the above formula we obtain Sh(v;A) = (5=12; 1=12; 1=12; 5=12) and in a similar way Sh(v;B) =
(1=4; 1=4; 1=4; 1=4).
Now, the following example shows that the generalization of the model of permission structures to antimatroids has
applications in other scopes.
Example 5. Let G=(V; A) be a directed graph with root r ∈V and c :V → R a map on the nodes called capacity function.
A c-compatible directed path with root r is a sequence of vertices (r; x1; : : : ; xk), such that rx1 : : : xk is a directed path and
14 E. Algaba et al. / Discrete Mathematics 282 (2004) 1–15
such that c(r)¿ k; c(x1)¿ k− 1; : : : ; c(xk)¿ 0. We interpret N =V\{r} as the clients of a certain source r and the edges
as the directed network that can be established among the clients from the source. The capacity of a vertex is the quantity
that can be retransmitted from it. The feasible coalitions that the clients can form are those in which, without inPuence
of others, can connect to the source through a directed c-compatible path. The structure that is de5ned is an antimatroid
called capacitated point search,
A=
{
E ⊆ N : ∀x∈E;∃c-compatible path (r; x1; : : : ; xk)such that {x1; : : : ; xk} ⊆ E and xk = x
}
:
These antimatroids do not satisfy the path property that characterize to the antimatroids which derived from a disjunctive
approach on an acyclic permission structure, further they are not poset antimatroids, as it is seen in the following example.
Consider the directed graph corresponding to Fig. 5, whose antimatroid of feasible coalitions is the one described in
Example 1. If we suppose that the source o=ers a discount in the prices of its service to groups that ask for it, depending
on their needs, the clients will obtain a pro5t cooperating among them. We de5ne a game that prizes this pro5t for each
cooperation assuming that it is proportional to the clients number. Without loss of generality we consider v(E) = |E| − 1,
for every non-empty coalition E ⊆ N and v(∅) = 0. In a cooperation among several players logically will be taken into
account the maximal feasible coalition that the players can form. We used the Shapley value on the game vA to determine
how to divide the pro5ts of a hypothetical cooperation among the four clients. In order to calculate the payo= of the
player 1 through formula (4) obtained in Theorem 6 we have to calculate before the sets Ai and {E ∈A : i∈ au(E)}.
So, for instance
A1 = {{1}; {1; 2}; {1; 4}; {1; 2; 3}; {1; 2; 4}; {1; 3; 4}; {1; 2; 3; 4}};
{E ∈A : 1∈ au(E)}= {∅; {4}; {3; 4}; {2; 3; 4}}:
In this way, the division of the pro5ts of the total cooperation, v(N ) = 3 is given by Sh(v;A) = (5=6; 2=3; 2=3; 5=6).
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